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Melian Dialogue Essay Spm

The Siege of Melos occurred in 416 BC during the Peloponnesian War, a war fought between Athens and Sparta. Melos is an island in the Aegean Sea roughly 110 km east of mainland Greece. At the time it was populated by Dorians. Though the Melians were of the same ethnic group as the Spartans, they chose to remain neutral in the war. Athens invaded Melos in 416 BC and demanded that the Melians surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or face annihilation. The proud Melians refused, and after a siege the Athenians captured their city, slaughtered the men, and enslaved the women and children.

This siege is best remembered for the Melian Dialogue by Thucydides, which is a dramatization of the negotiations between the Athenians and the Melians before the former launched the siege. It is taught as a classic case study in political realism to illustrate that selfish and pragmatic concerns ultimately motivate a country at war.


The Peloponnesian War lasted from 431 to 404 BC. On one side was the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of Greek cities led by Sparta. On the other side was the Delian League, an alliance led by Athens. The people of Melos had ancestral ties to Sparta[1][2] but were independent.[3] In 427 BC the Melians donated at least twenty Aeginetan minae[4][5] (roughly 12½ kg[6] of silver) to the Spartan war effort. Otherwise, the island remained neutral in the war.[7]

In 426 BC, Athens sent an army of 2,000 men led by Nicias to raid the Melian countryside,[8] but the Melians refused to do battle and the Athenians were not willing to mount a siege.[9] In 425 or 424 BC, Athens formally demanded of Melos a tribute of fifteen talents[10][11] of silver (roughly 390 kg[12]). This sum could have paid the wages of a trireme crew for 15 months,[13] or bought 540 metric tons of wheat, enough to feed 2,160 men for a year.[14] Only the islands of Paros and Thasos were assessed for more at 30 and 60 talents respectively.[15] This is evidence that Melos was a prosperous island. Melos had never paid tribute to Athens before, and they refused to pay now.[16]

The siege[edit]

In the summer of 416 BC, during a truce with Sparta, Athens sent an army of at least 3,400 men to conquer Melos: 1,600 heavy infantry, 300 archers, and 20 mounted archers all from Athens, plus 1,500 heavy infantry from other Delian League cities. The fleet that transported this army had 38 ships: 30 from Athens, 6 from Chios, and 2 from Lesbos. This expedition was led by the generals Cleomedes and Tisias.[18] After setting up camp on the island, the Athenians sent emissaries to negotiate with the rulers of Melos. The emissaries demanded that Melos join the Delian League and pay tribute to Athens or face destruction. The Melians rejected the ultimatum. The Athenians laid siege to the city and withdrew most of their troops from the island to fight elsewhere. The Melians made a number of sorties, at one point capturing part of the Athenians' lines, but failed to break the siege. Athens sent reinforcements under the command of Philocrates. The Athenians also had help from traitors within Melos.[19] Melos surrendered in the winter of 416 or 415 BC.[20]

The Athenians executed the adult men[21] and sold the women and children into slavery. They then settled 500 of their own colonists on the island.[19]

Restoration by Sparta[edit]

In 405 BC, with Athens losing the war, the Spartan general Lysander expelled the Athenian settlers from Melos and restored the survivors of the original Dorian colony to the island.[22][23] The once-independent Melos became a Spartan territory. It now had a Spartan garrison and a military governor (a harmost).[24]

The Melian Dialogue[edit]

In History of the Peloponnesian War (book 5, chapters 84–116), the contemporary Athenian historian Thucydides inserted a dramatization of the negotiations between the emissaries of the Athenian invaders and the rulers of Melos. Thucydides did not witness the negotiations and in fact had been in exile at the time, so this dialogue only captures the substance of what he believed was discussed.

In summary, the Athenian emissaries appealed to the Melians' sense of pragmatism, citing the Athenian army's overwhelming strength and their "reasonable" surrender terms, whereas the Melians appealed to the Athenians' sense of decency. Neither side was able to sway the other and the negotiations failed. This dialogue is frequently cited by political scientists and diplomats as a classic case study in political realism. It demonstrates the foolishness of pride and hope, and that selfish and pragmatic concerns drive wars.


The Athenians offer the Melians an ultimatum: surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed. The Athenians do not wish to waste time arguing over the morality of the situation, because in practice might makes right—or, in their own words, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".[25]

The Melians argue that they are a neutral city and not an enemy, so Athens has no need to conquer them. The Athenians counter that if they accept Melos' neutrality and independence, they would look weak: Their subjects would think that they left Melos alone because they were not strong enough to conquer it.

The Melians argue that an invasion will alarm the other neutral Greek states, who will become hostile to Athens for fear of being invaded themselves. The Athenians counter that the Greek states on the mainland are unlikely to act this way. It is the independent island states and the disgruntled subjects that Athens has already conquered that are more likely to take up arms against Athens.

The Melians argue that it would be shameful and cowardly of them to submit without a fight. The Athenians counter that it is only shameful to submit to an opponent whom one has a reasonable chance of defeating. There is no shame in submitting to an overwhelmingly superior opponent like Athens.

The Melians argue that though the Athenians are far stronger, there is at least a slim chance that the Melians could win, and they will regret not trying their luck. The Athenians counter that this argument is emotional and short-sighted. If the Melians lose, which is highly likely, they will come to bitterly regret their foolish optimism.

The Melians believe that they will have the assistance of the gods because their position is morally just. The Athenians counter that the gods will not intervene because it is the natural order of things for the strong to dominate the weak.

The Melians argue that their Spartan kin will come to their defense. The Athenians counter that the Spartans are a practical people who never put themselves at risk when their interests are not at stake, and rescuing Melos would be especially risky since Athens has the stronger navy.

The Athenians express their shock at the Melians' lack of realism. They say that there is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy, especially one who is offering reasonable terms. They also argue that it is sensible to submit to one's superiors, stand firm against one's equals, and be moderate to one's inferiors. The Melians do not change their minds and politely dismiss the envoys.


Warships of the era (triremes) could carry little in the way of supplies, and thus needed friendly and neutral ports where the crew could purchase food and other necessities on a daily basis.[26] Whether or not Melos was truly neutral, Peloponnesian ships could freely resupply there, which made it strategically important to the enemy.[27] Capturing Melos reduced the reach of the enemy's navy.

The mercilessness which the Athenian invaders showed to the Melians was exceptional even for the time and shocked many Greeks, even in Athens.[28] These may have included the Athenian playwright Euripides, whose play The Trojan Women is widely regarded as a commentary on the razing of Melos. The historian Xenophon wrote that in 405 BC, with the Spartan army closing in on Athens, the citizens of Athens worried that the Spartans would treat them with the same cruelty that the Athenian army had shown the Melians.[29] The Athenian rhetorician Isocrates was a proud patriot but accepted that the razing of Melos was a stain on Athens' history.[30][31]

It is uncertain whether the fate of Melos was decided by the government of Athens or the Athenian generals on Melos. A historical speech falsely attributed to the Athenian orator Andocides claims that the statesman Alcibiades advocated the enslavement of the Melian survivors before the government of Athens.[32] This account gives no date for the decree, so it could have been passed to justify the atrocities after-the-fact.[33] Thucydides made no mention of any such decree in his own account.

The phrase "Melian hunger" became a byword for extreme starvation. Starvation is a normal goal of sieges and the ancient Greeks had much experience with them, so this suggests that the Melian experience was extreme. The earliest known reference to the starvation of the Melians is in Aristophanes' play, The Birds, which was first performed in 414 BC.[34] Its usage lasted well into the Byzantine era, as it is mentioned in the Suda, a 10th-century Byzantine encyclopedia.[35]

See also[edit]


  • Constantakopoulou, Christy (2007). The Dance of the Islands. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-921595-9. 
  • Gardner, Percy (1918). A History of Ancient Coinage. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 
  • Hanson, Victor (2011). A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. Random House Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-58836-490-6. 
  • Herodotus (1998) [440 BC]. Dewald, Carolyn, ed. The Histories. Translated by Waterfield, Robin. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-212609-2. 
  • Hultsch, Friedrich (1882). Griechische und Römische Metrologie [Greek and Roman Metrology] (in German) (2nd ed.). Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 
  • Loomis, William T. (1992). The Spartan War Fund: IG V 1, 1 and a New Fragment. Franz Steiner Verlag. ISBN 978-3-515-06147-6. 
  • Low, Polly, ed. (2008). Athenian Empire. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-3124-7. 
  • Meiggs, Russell (1972). The Athenian Empire. Carendon Press. 
  • Meritt, Benjamin Dean; McGregor, Malcolm Francis (1950). The Athenian Tribute Lists. 3. ASCSA. ISBN 978-0-87661-913-1. 
  • Michell, Humfrey (1964). Sparta. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-09219-7. 
  • Midlarsky, Manus (2005). The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-44539-9. 
  • Renfrew, Colin; Wagstaff, Malcolm, eds. (1982). An Island Polity: The Archaeology of Exploitation in Melos. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-23785-8. 
  • Sabin, Philip; van Wees, Hans; Whitby, Michael, eds. (2008). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-78273-9. 
  • Smith, William; Wayte, William; Marindin, G. E., eds. (1890). A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. John Murray (Albermane Street, London). 
  • Thucydides (c. 400 BC). History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley (1914).
  • Tritle, Lawrence A. (2002). From Melos to My Lai: A Study in Violence, Culture and Social Survival. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-60364-0. 
  • Winiarczyk, Marek (2016). Diagoras of Melos: A Contribution to the History of Ancient Atheism. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. ISBN 978-3-11-044765-1. 
  • Zimmern, Alfred (1961). The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. 


  1. ^Herodotus. The Histories, 8.48: "The Melians (who are of Lacedaemonian stock) [...]"
  2. ^Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.84: "The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon [...]"
  3. ^Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982), p. 49: "The start of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta in 431 BC saw Melos and Thera still independent..."
  4. ^Geoffrey Ernest Maurice de Ste Croix (1954). "The Character of the Athenian Empire". An essay originally published in Historia 3, republished in Low (2008): "Epigraphic evidence allows us to go further still: it puts the original Athenian attack on Melos in quite a different light. The inscription found near Sparta [...] records two separate donations by Melos to the Spartan war-funds, one of twenty Aeginetan minae [...] The other figure has perished. The donors are described, it will be noticed, as toi Malioi, 'the Melians'. [...] This shows that the Melian subscription was an official one. [...] there is good reason to think these gifts to Sparta were made in the spring of 427."
  5. ^The evidence is an inscription (Inscriptiones Graecae V 1, 1) which reads: "The Melians gave to the Lacedaimonians twenty mnas of silver." See Loomis (1992), p 13
  6. ^According to Hultsch (1882), an Aeginetan mina weighed 605 grams. Smith et al. (1890) estimates a weight of 630 grams. Gardner (1918) writes it weighed exactly 9,600 grains, which is about 622 grams.
  7. ^Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.84: "[The Melians] at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility."
  8. ^Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.91
  9. ^Meiggs (1972), p. 322
  10. ^Zimmern (1961), p 440
  11. ^Brian Sparkes, in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982): "They were assessed at the figure of fifteen talents [...]"
  12. ^The mass of an Attic talent was 26.196 kg according to Hultsch (1882), and 25.992 kg according to Dewald (1998).
  13. ^Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.8: "Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them."
  14. ^Brian Sparkes, in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982), p 277–278: "[...] the assessed Melian tribute of 390 kg of silver would buy wheat sufficient to feed 2,160 men for one year. [...] 390 kg of silver would have bought, as calculated above, 540,000 kg of wheat in 425/424 BC."
  15. ^In 425 or 424 BC, the government of Athens drew up a list of its client cities and the tributes it expected from each according to their respective wealth. This list was inscribed on marble slabs that were publicly displayed in Athens. The Athenians had hundreds of such presumptuous donors. A few these, taken from tables appearing in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982), Meritt & McGregor (1950), p. 349, and Zimmern (1961) and Attic Inscriptions Online, include:

    Thasos — 60 talents
    Paros — 30 talents
    Andros — 15 talents
    Melos — 15 talents
    Naxos — 15 talents
    Ceos — 10 talents
    Chalcis — 10 talents
    Kea — 10 talents
    Tenos — 10 talents
    Siphnos — 9 talents
    Kythnos — 6 talents
    Carystos — 5 talents
    Thera — 5 talents
    Mykonos — 2 talents
    Seriphos — 2 talents
    Ios — 1 talent
    Syros — 1 talent
  16. ^Brian Sparkes, in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982)
  17. ^Based on an essay by Brian Sparkes, published in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982).
  18. ^Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 5.84
  19. ^ abThucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 5.116
  20. ^Thucydides' account suggests the siege lasted only from summer to winter of 416 BC. Barry Strauss in Sabin et al. (2008) wrote that it lasted one year. Several online sources, such as the official tourism website of Melos, say it lasted two years.
  21. ^Some translators such as Rex Warner used the phrase "men of military age". The key word in the account by Thucydides is hebôntas (ἡβῶντας), which generally describes people who have passed puberty and in this context refers to the men as Thucydides described a different fate for the women and children. Another possible translation is "men in their prime". Thucydides made no specific mention of what happened to the elderly males.
  22. ^Xenophon. Hellenica, 2.2.9: "Meantime Lysander, upon reaching Aegina, restored the state to the Aeginetans, gathering together as many of them as he could, and he did the same thing for the Melians also and for all the others who had been deprived of their native states."
  23. ^Plutarch. Life of Lysander, 14.3: "But there were other measures of Lysander upon which all the Greeks looked with pleasure, when, for instance, the Aeginetans, after a long time, received back their own city, and when the Melians and Scionaeans were restored to their homes by him, after the Athenians had been driven out and had delivered back the cities."
  24. ^Brain Sparkes, in Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982), p 50
  25. ^This is Crawley's translation. Warner translated this line as: "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept". Jowett translated this line as: "the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must". Thomas Hobbes translated this as: "they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get".
  26. ^Hanson (2011): "[...] triremes could venture out for only a few hours each day. They were entirely dependent on friendly shores to provide food and water each evening. There was very little room to stow food and water in the ships, given the number of rowers and the need for spare rigging and parts. [...] every captain had to berth his trireme each night someplace where fresh water was abundant. [...] To travel even short distances, triremes needed safe ports at intervals of fifty miles or so, where ships could find food (barley bread, onions, dried fish, meats, fruit, and olive oil), water, wine, and shelter for their crews to sleep in. [...] Much of Athenian foreign policy, including its efforts to maintain an ochapteras empire in the Aegean, cultivate allies such as Argos and Corcyra, and establish dependencies at distant Amphipolis and Potidaea, was predicated on just the need to create permanent bases to facilitate long-distance cruises."
  27. ^Renfrew & Wagstaff (1982), p. 49: "...[Melos'] harbour was doubtless useful to either side…"
  28. ^Winiarczyk (2016)
  29. ^Xenophon. Hellenica, 2.2.3: "There was mourning and sorrow for those that were lost, but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper sorrow for themselves, as they pictured the evils they were about to suffer, the like of which they themselves had inflicted upon the men of Melos, who were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, when they mastered them by siege."

    This event takes place after the people of Athens learned of their navy's final defeat at the Battle of Aegospotami.
  30. ^Isocrates. Panegyricus, 100: "Now up to this point I am sure that all men would acknowledge that our city has been the author of the greatest number of blessings, and that she should in fairness be entitled to the hegemony. But from this point on some take us to task, urging that after we succeeded to the sovereignty of the sea we brought many evils upon the Hellenes; and, in these speeches of theirs, they cast it in our teeth that we enslaved the Melians and destroyed the people of Scione."
  31. ^Isocrates. Panathenaicus, 62–63: "But I think that, while those who find these words distasteful to listen to will not deny that what I have said is the truth nor, again, will they be able to cite other activities of the Lacedaemonians through which they brought to pass many blessings to the Hellenes, yet they will attempt—as is ever their habit—to denounce our city, to recount the most offensive acts which transpired while she held the empire of the sea, to present in a false light the adjudication of lawsuits in Athens for the allies and her collection of tribute from them, and above all to dwell on the cruelties suffered at her hands by the Melians and the Scionians and the Toronians, thinking by these reproaches to sully the benefactions of Athens which I have just described."
  32. ^Andocides (pseudo). Against Alcibiades, 22: "[The youth of Athens] take Alcibiades as their model, Alcibiades who carries his villainy to such unheard-of lengths that, after recommending that the people of Melos be sold into slavery, he purchased a woman from among the prisoners and has since had a son by her, a child whose birth was more unnatural than that of Aegis"
  33. ^Tritle (2002)
  34. ^Aristophanes. The Birds, line 186 (translated by Ian Johnson, 2008): "Then you'd rule all men as if they're locusts and annihilate the gods with famine, just like in Melos."
  35. ^The Suda. The relevant entry is Λιμὸς Μηλιαῖος (Fames Meliæa).

Coordinates: 36°41′N24°25′E / 36.683°N 24.417°E / 36.683; 24.417

Melos, and the approximate location of the ancient city.[17]

During part of the Peloponnesian War, Athens attacked Melos. The catastrophic results of the war on Melos were a result of what Thucydides called realism. Thucydides, often considered the father of political realism, wrote about the Peloponnesian War from the vantage point of Athens, and in The Melian Dialogue, gives his point of view on what happened when the Athenians defeated the Melians and then proceeded to kill all the men, and sell the women and children.

Thucydides wrote the Melian Dialogue to exemplify what he deemed the cause of the defeat, which he pinpointed as realism. The Peloponnesian War was an early example that exhibited the disasters, which can arise between different groups when a stronger power exerts its dominance over a weaker one.


Thucydides explains the Athenians reason for going after Melos in the following way, "By subjugating the Melians the Athenians hoped not only to extend their empire but also to improve their image and thus their security. To allow the weaker Melians to remain free, according to the Athenians, would reflect negatively on Athenian power".[1] Thucydides explains the defeat of the Melians by indicating the main cause as one relating to political realism, insofar as the Athenians were quick to be cruelly domineering and take over the island colony, belonging to Sparta, mainly because it was weak. One main idea of realism is the preface that states will act as rational actors, meaning state's actions will reflect their best interests.


According to professor of political science, Steven L. Spiegel,[2]

"The school of thought known as realism is the most venerable paradigm in international relations theory. Its roots can be traced back hundreds of years to the Greek historian Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian Wars"

Spiegel’s interpretation of Thucydides writings as examples of realism could be at fault when it comes to whether or not the destruction of Melos was an act attributable to realism or a barbaric act of mass murder. Spiegel, as well as other realists who see realism as the main cause of interactions between states are quick to point out Thucydides writings as the seeds upon which modern political realism grew. However, a bias also arises because of the labeling of this event and what some consider genocide, as realism. Of primary importance today is whether or not The Peloponnesian War, specifically the destruction of Melos, exemplified realism or was something far beyond that. As the defeat of Melos was deemed a result of realism, so could the Rwandan Genocide be called the same as a stronger power dominated over a weaker one. Realism might be seen in interactions involving the world economy, trade, and diplomatic relations, as well as war but an occurrence such as what happened in Melos or what happened in Rwanda, should not be deemed a result of realism. Instead, it should be far outside the scope of understanding. It was not in Athens best interest to kill the people of Melos. However, because this war, mainly the destruction of Melos, is often referred to by modern realists, its significance is abounding and the events must not be looked at parsimoniously. What happened in Melos, if an example of states acting in a realist manner, raises many questions.


According to Israel W. Charny in The Encyclopedia of Genocide:

The most frequently cited case of genocide perpetrated in antiquity is the destruction of Melos by the Athenians in 416 B.C.E. This is more probably because modern scholars have read Thucydides celebrated "Melian Dialogue" which sets out a rationale of sorts for ancient imperialism than because of their familiarity with antiquity. [3]
Not only is the destruction of Melos considered an example of realism but it is also pinpointed as an important example of genocide. This gives the impression that genocide can be explained in terms of realism. However, I find fault in this idea. Cases of genocide and realism do not generally go hand in hand. Therefore, because people are trying to find an explanation for genocide, they may turn to realism but realism as an answer leaves questions unanswered. This example of genocide is important when it comes to trying to prevent further genocides in the future and also when trying to find an explanation and solution to prevent further genocides from taking place.

Reasons Why The Peloponnesian War is Relevant Today[edit]

David Cooper explains the wars place in modern political thought in his book, The Geography of Genocide, by writing,

The Peloponnesian War occurred at the end of the fifth century B.C., and it continues to haunt students of political science who are forced to understand the realist school of politics. The savagery of the war between Athens and Sparta, in which ‘sons were killed by their father,’ reveals much about the moral foundations upon which Western civilization was built. Our primary source for understanding this conflict remains Thucydides, although more comprehensive historical analyses have been published in recent years.

[4] When looking to find examples of realism, there is a definite bias that comes into play. This is one that arises from a desire to prove realism is an always evident paradigm that can explain past and future occurrences. The problem becomes explaining how if realism is always at play, then why would Melos not have submitted. In my opinion, the most important uncertainty arising from the Peloponnesian War is why Melos took what actions it did. If this were an example of realism, Melos would have likely given in to the Athenians and saved themselves.

See also[edit]


External links[edit]

  1. ^Thucydides. "Essentials of International Relations". Ed. Suresht Bald. Trans. Richard Crawley. New York : Norton, 1999.
  2. ^Spiegel, Steven L., et al. World Politics in a New Era. 4th. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  3. ^Charny, Israel W. "Encyclopedia of Genocide". Vol. 2. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999.
  4. ^Cooper, Alan D. "The Geography of Genocide". Lanham: University Press of America, 2009.